Abstract-Multiple anagramming is a general method for the cryptanalysis of transposition ciphers, and has a graph theoretic representation. Inspired by a partially mechanised approach used in World War 11, we consider the possibility of a fully automated attack. Two heuristics based on measures of natural language are used -one to recognise plaintext, and another to guide construction of the secret key. This is shown to be unworkable for cryptograms of a certain difficulty due to random variation in the constructive heuristic. A solver based on an ant colony optimisation (ACO) algorithm is then introduced, increasing the range of cryptograms that can be treated: the pheromone feedback provides a mechanism for the recognition heuristic to correct the noisy constructive heuristic.
Introduction
Cryptography has had a long and colourful history. The earliest schemes, now termed the classical ciphers, were designed to he carried out with pen and paper rather than by electronics. Many were transpositions: algorithms which rearrange the order of letters in a message. Classical cryptography became ohsolete after the advent of computers: more complex ciphers could be used, and older ciphers hroken with greater ease. Nonetheless, modern analogues of classical schemes can still be found as components of larger ciphers. In particular. some iterated block ciphers. such as the Data Encryption Standard [Nat99], incorporate transpositions to provide diffusion. The cryptanalyst's tactic when presented with a transposition was to exploit particular statistical features of the ciphertext, as well as to rely upon intuition, luck and trial-anderror, to find the correct decryption. As this was sometimes too slow a process. mechanised aids were used as early as World War I1 [Bau97] by which frequencies of letter pairs (known as bigrams) were automatically examined in order to narrow down the space of possible keys. The remaining few keys could then be checked exhaustively by hand to recover the plaintext.
We consider the possibility of fully automating this procedure. A straightforward implementation turns out to be incapable of decrypting harder cryptograms due to random 'variation in the higram heuristic. We quantify which cryptograms are hard for this algorithm. It will he shown that the pheromone feedback mechanism of an Ant Colony System is capable of overcoming some random variation and decrypting a wider variety of messages.
A preliminary version of this result was summarised in [RCS03] .
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: first. we review transposition ciphers. Section 2, and standard attacks on transpositions, Section 3. In Section 4, the fully automated attack is presented. A dictionary-based score is used to recognise plaintext. However. difficulties with the bigram heuristic limit its application. The remedial Ant Colony System is then given in Section 5 , with experimental results in Section 6. Previous approaches are contrasted in Section I , and finally conclusions are given in Section 8.
Transposition Ciphers and Bigrams
In this section, two forms of the transposition cipher (see [Gai391) are introduced and their cryptanalysis shown to he equivalent. The first is known as columiiar transposirioil. In this cipher. the plaintext is written into a grid of fixed width. padded with dummy characters if necessary. The columns of the grid are numhered according to a permutation -the permutation forms the secret key -and read off columnwise in that sequence. As an example. consider the plaintext "MYANTALGORITHMSARERIDDLEDWITHBUGS", encrypted using the key (31524): l U / G I S / X I X 
Historical Cryptanalysis of Transposition Ciphers
One property of written natural language is that the distribution of pairs of letters. known as bigrunis. is not uniform. In English. for example. 'TH' is common and 'QZ' is rare.
Using some large sample of text, stripped of numbers, punctuation, whitespace and other non-letters, a standard prohahility for each higram can he obtained'. For other texts. the ohserved frequencies will tend to he close to these prohahilities. Two columns placed next to each other form several higrams, one for each row. The bigruni adjacerzc? score, Adj~I.,,,, is detined as the average prohahility of the higrains created by juxtaposing columns I and J , i.e.. r=t where I , and J , denote the rth letter in the column I or J respectively. Pqrd(xy) is the standard probability of the bigram 'xy', and h is the numher of rows in a column. The score will he higher for two correctly aligned columns, hecause the higrams will he from the plaintext. If they are incorrectly aligned, the pairs will he much more random, and likely to score lower. This distinction is examined more rigorously in Section 4.
From the higram adjacency score, a pen-and-paper cryptanalyst infcrs the top candidates for each column's neighbour. Together with other statistical clues, it is usually straightforward to reassemble the columns correctly.
'For the exprirnentr described in this paper. these probabilities were taken to k the same 81. the relative frequencies of hiprams observed iii a 140000 character novel IWe1981.
A more general method is also known [Bau97] that is less reliant on ad hoc exploitation of particular features of the cryptogram. This method has heen partially automated, as mentioned in the introduction. and will now he considered in more detail.
We will first need some preliminaries: hy I // J . we mean that when columns I and J are adjaccnt in that order they form higrams from the plaintext. If this is not the case. We will call such a graph the anagranrnzbrg graph of the prohlem. Each node denotes a column. A directed arc from column I to column .J indicates that I 11 J has not heen ruled out.
Since the transposition key is a permutation. a candidate key can he represented as some path through the column nodes which does not pass through the same column twice. Normally. this would specify IO! possible keys. where ti! is the width of the grid: even for small UI this precludes an exhaustive search. In the historical attack, arcs on the anagramming graph are pruned to restrict the numher of paths. The number of keys is hopefully reduced to a point where each can he checked by hand to see which produces a comprehensible plaintext. To prune the arcs. a cutoff value a is chosen; an arc is included from node I to J if and only if Adj(1.J) >a.
In the following section we attempt to convert this into a fully automated attack.
A Fully Automated Attack
Human interaction is still required for the recognition of plaintext. This can he automated by a heuristic score based on the numher of dictionary words in a candidate decryplion. Longcr words are given more weight than shorter words -they are less likely to appear hy chance and so give stronger evidence of a correct decryption. Let I \ " be the number of d-letter substrings from the text which are present in a standard dictionary. The dictionary heuristic used in this paper is defined as:
where L is the length of the text. A list of 40 000 words.
derived from [AtkOl] . is used as the standard dictionary.
In practice. we find that Dict(d/) is maximum whenever . U is the correct plaintext. considered over all the possible decryptions AI of a cryptogram. Hence, one way to recover the plaintext is to consider the maximisation problem with Dict as the objective function. Specifically. all the paths through the pruned anagramming graph are evaluated using Dict, and the maximum is identified as the plaintext.
It remains to select the cutoff value a. The choice for n is critical both to the time complexity of the algorithm and the possibility of finding the correct decryption at all. If a is chosen too high, then it is likely that the arc linking two columns I and J , where I 11 J . will he pruned. This would he disastrous. as the correct key is removed from the search space. Conversely. if a is too low, though the confidence in retaining the right solution increases, the time taken to find it rises too hecause there are more paths through the graph. In this algorithm. there is a direct tradeoff hetween computational efficiency and prohahilily of success.
We will attempt to derive some guidance on the choice of a . When juxraposing two columns I and J . consider for the moment ,just the bigram produced in the top row, 11 Ji. We can define a random variable on I I J 1 ,
where P s t d ( I l . J 1 ) is the standard probability of the bigram IIJ1 appearing in natural language text. These probabilities are assumed to be known, determined using a standard corpus. and are used helow to calculate expected values.
If I I/ J , the bigram will occur with probability
The expected value of S ( I I J 1 ) is therefore Table I : a cutoff values which give a 95% probability of the correct solution being in an anagramming graph for a cryptogram of fixed width U! = 1.5 and varying height h .
The variance of S(I1J1) can also he calculated in a similar fashion. Two juxtaposed columns form several bigrams, one for each row. Adj(,,,, , is the mean value of S over all the rows. Assuming that the bigram on each row is independent. Adj,r.J, is a sample mean with a sample size of h. the height of the column (11 = L/ur). By the Central Limit Theorem. this can he approximated by a normal distribution, obtaining:
For any cutoff value a, and some pair of columns I and J where I 11 J . the probability p c that the arc between those columns will he in the anagramming graph can he calculated using (10). ut ~ 1 correct arcs are needed in total. and. again assuming independence, the probability that the anagramming graph contains the correct solution is given by p:-l. The reasoning can also he performed backwards; for a fixed probability, e.g. 95%. an a value can be calculated, dependent on h and U I . This has been done in Table I for w = 15.
Unfortunately, (I 1) suggests that using a low value for a will result in few arcs being pruned, increasing the computational cost. It is also a time-consuming task Just to identify all the legal paths in the graph even before they can he checked. If the automated cryptanalysis is to he tractable. a more subtle method is needed.
A cursory investigation using local search techniques indicated that maximising Dict is made difficult by the existence of many local optima. It might he helpful to make use of the information provided by A d j ( I . J , , despite some noise. to give guidance towards the promising regions of the search space. For this task, we examine an Ant Colony Optimisation approach. ACO was originally applied to the " P h a r d Travelling Salesman Problem (TSP). Finding solutions in the anagramming graph bears many similarities to an Asymmetric TSP (ATSP). A specific ant algorithm with known success on the TSP is Ant Colony System (ACS). The reader is referred to [DG97] for a full description: here we will only highlight differences and specifics in the adaptation for this problem.
S Ants for Cryptanalysis
Ants construct paths on the anagramming graph of a cryptogram; each complete path is a permutation of the nodes corresponding to a key. It is not necessary to prune arcs, as ACS makes use o f a heuristic qij, which represents some a priori knowledge of the desirability of choosing node j while at node i . For this. .4dj(/. J 1 is used. In each iteration, after the ants have constructed their paths, pheromone is deposited on arcs in the graph corresponding to the best path found since the start of the algorithm. A completed path. which is a decryption key, is evaluated using the Dict heuristic on the plaintext produced.
The essential difference between the multiple anagramming problem and the ATSP is the use of one heuristic for constructing a solution, Adj!I.J,. and another for evaluating it, Dict; see Tahle . and encrypted using a fixed key. The ACS solver returns a key candidate within 5000 Dict evaluations. We recorded only whether the key was exactly equal to the correct decryption key.
The results show that the ACS algorithm is most likely to succeed on cryptograms with a small width and large height. This is consistent with what we know: a large height provides many higram samples for any column pair. meaning A4dj(/.J) is a more reliable statistic. A small width gives a small key-space over which the algorithm must search.
Figure 2 also indicates that cryptograms can sometimes be solved even when the key size is as large as 40. In this case the total number of possible keys is 40! % lo", but the ACS solver examines (using Dict) only 5000 of them in order to locate the correct key. Sometimes, ACS returns solutions that are close to the key. For example, two elements in the permutation might he in the incorrect order, or the permutation may start on the wrong column. Despite this, the plaintext remains mostly reddahle. To investigate this property. we use a success metric which counts the number of columns which are placed before their correct successor. [FSN93, SJNK93, CD98l . Table 3 lists typical results from previous work on transpositions. together with some from this paper. The various approaches involve differing heuristics. processing time and success criteria. Despite this. a comparison does give a rough indication of the regions of difficulty in the problem space. It also shows that the ACS algorithm presented in this paper can decrypt cryptograms which are significantly shorter (up to a factor of about a half) than those tackled by previous metaheuristic methods.
The ability of ACS to successfully decrypt cryptograms of shorter length can he attributed to the use of a dictionary heuristic in addition to higrams. The earlier approaches used only higrams to evaluate the fitness of candidate solutions. This is susceptible to noise in shorter messages for similar reasons to the problems demonstrated in the higram ad,jacency score. In a local search method, this leads to a situation where locating the global optimum does not guarantee the correct decryption of the cryptogram; this was noted in [GSN94] . Local search algorithms could potentially he modified to use the dictionary score. One pitfall is that the dictionary heuristic does not define a very smooth search space; e.g. an interchange ofjust two columns would in all likelihood destroy a long and high scoring word. It would he desireable to comhine it with the higram heuristic in some way: however, it is not immediately obvious as to how this could he done robustly. A constructive algorithm. like ACS. allows both heuristics to he integrated in a natural way.
A recent result indicates that melaheuristic techniques may he applicable to modern cipher cryptanalysis: in [HSIROZ] , statistical flaws in a reduced-round version or the hlock cipher TEA are found using a genetic algorithm.
Conclusions and Further Work
It has heen shown how the cryptanalysis of transposition ciphers can he completely automated in a ciphertext-only attack.
Two heuristics are used: one for recognising plaintext using a dictionary. D i d . and another for indicating adjacent columns using higrams, Adj,,. J ) . Taken by themselves, each is insufficient to easily decrypt a diflicult crypto,oram. Constructing the key solely using the higram scores hecomes infeasihle when random variation causes the heuristic to he deceptive. Equally, Dict defines a search space that is hard to maximise. However. in ACS both heuristics can he used in a complementary fashion to rapidly find the solution. The higram scores provide hints to the right region of the Dict search space. The pheromone feedback. calculated using Dict, compensates for any noise in the Adj(,.J, scores.
The capability of maximising D i d allows much shorter cryptograms to he automatically decrypted compared to previous techniques. When 5000 D i d evaluations are used. the length can be reduced by a factor of around two.
We believe this is the first application of an Ant Colony Optimisation approach to cryptanalysis. More difficult transposition schemes. such as irregular and double columnar transpositions. might also he vulnerable to this approach. However. it is unlikely that these methods will pose a threat to modern ciphers in direct key-recovery attacks such as those just presented -the key spaces are designed to he as discontinuous as possible. Nonetheless. much of modern cryptanalysis is concerned with extracting information reliably from noisy statistics; perhaps ants could improve existing techniques. [CDSS] Andrew Clark and Ed Dawson. Optimisation heuristics for the automated cryptanalysis of clas-
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